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Memorandum for:

The attached briefing paper was requested by Ty Cobb, NSC. It covers the background and prospects of the Italian Communist Party (PCI).

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	The Italian Communist	Party	
I. How Powerful a	re the Italian Communists?	,	Ą
Western Europe. between the Christ points in the Cham within striking di	stance of becoming the large tion takes place. With 30 pe	largest Communist Party in last June, which saw the gap	
PCI supp substant	ort is not limited to blue co ial support from the upper a	ollar workers. It also draws and middle classes.	
everywhe	unists have established a signer or strong the center and northwest of	gest, however <u>, in the u</u> rban	
II. The Communist	Position Today		
	stian Democrats lost more that t June, a landslide defeat by	an 5 percentage points in the / Italian standards.	
first ti	tion results have made it mat me for the Communists and sma nt without the Christian Demo		
the Soci Communis	not very likely at the moment alists and the Communists and t leader Enrico Berlinguer and gard each other.	t because of the rivalry between I the suspicion with which and Socialist leader Bettino	2
the Communists. S	n Democrats r to be interested in the po- ome Communist and Christian interest in a possible deal		
there have be Democrats and Comm something which wo government. They in which the Commu	en secret exploratory talks I unist leaders. The DC polit uld fall short of actual Com	petween left-wing Christian icians presumably have in mind munist participaton in the pric compromise" of 1976-1979, or Christian Democratic-led	
The prospects	for a deal between the Chris		
	g Christian Democrats know this communist factions within		

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many Communi	er Berlinguer could also have trouble selling a deal sts feel they were double-crossed and put off with the period of the "historic compromise."	25X1
the Communists cannot be	rospect of a deal between the Christian Democrats and totally disregarded. Many Christian Democrats and one thing their dislike for Socialist leader Craxi.	
than they are t	ways a more dangerous political rival to both parties to each other because his party is in a position to port from both the Communists and the DC	25X′
III. Origins of Communist	Strength	
The Communists owe to historical and socio-e	heir pivotal position on the Italian political scene conomic factors.	
role in the und occupation. Un	ed their credentials as patriots through their leading lerground resistance to Mussolini and the German like the situation of the British or American by are not generally seen as the agents of an alien	I
establish thems nots in postwar and unemployed	nt party of opposition, they have been able to elves as the spokesman of the discontented and have- Italy. Their supporters include industrial workers or underemployed university graduates, as well as by the corruption of the Italian political system.	25X1
The Communists have organization and good lea	made the most of these advantages through strong dership.	25 X 1
distancing them Soviet abuses o	essed their reputation as patriotic Italians by selves from the Soviets condemning, for example, f human rights, the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and up d'etat in Poland.	
participants in democracy by	lished themselves as "democrats" and "responsible" the political system rather than enemies of building a long record of responsible participation nd opposition to political terrorism.	25X′
IV. Changes in Italian Co	ommunism	
	s that in addition to taking advantage of the system, some extent have been coopted by it.	
	rd indicates that sponsible leaders within the party who think tablishing Communist rule or a one-party state in	25X ⁻
Lingering hopes of this k	ind appear to have been dispelled by the fall of the	
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Allende government in Chile in 1973. Leaders drew the conclusion that there was no hope for a Communist government to survive in a Western country unless it was supported by an overwhelming majority of the population -- not a realistic possibility in Italy.

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The evidence indicates in fact that the domestic political tactics of the Communists are not too dissimilar from those of the other Italian parties. Their major goal is to win representation in the government through the control of one or more ministries. They would hope to use this not only to pursue programmatic goals, but also as evidence of "respectability" to enhance their appeal at the polls.

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-- Under the circumstances in which they would be likely to share in power -- as part of a multi-party coalition -- they would be compelled to behave like the other parties, compromising on one point to secure concessions on another.

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V. Communist Internal Problems

Moreover, the successes of Italian communism have not come free of cost. Traditional Communist voters have not been able to accept the party's willingness to support centrist governments and austerity measures that hit workers the hardest.

- -- Although the Communists held steady in the last elections, they have slipped more than 4 percentage points from the high reached in 1976.
- -- The party's drift toward compromise with the "bourgeois" parties and its dropoff in the polls have strengthened a trend toward factionalism within the party leadership. At least five factions, ranging from old-line Stalinists to Social-Democrats can be identified.

Although the prominence of moderates in the party leadership makes the Communists more acceptable partners to the other Italian parties, their internal divisions also rob them of much of the organizational advantage they have enjoyed in the past.

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VI. Significance for the United States

The relatively modest goals and internal problems of the Communists does not mean that their participation in government would be a matter of indifference to the United States. Although no puppets of the Soviet Union, few Italian Communist leaders are disposed toward friendship with the United States. There is little reason to doubt that once in government, they would attempt to nudge Italy in the direction of a more neutralist stance.

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